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Abstract
Value adjustment of uncollateralized trades is determined within a
risk–neutral pricing framework. When hedging such trades, investors can-
not freely trade protection on their own name, thus facing an incomplete
market. This fact is reflected in the non–uniqueness of the pricing mea-
sure, which is only constrained by the values of the hedging instruments
tradable by the investor. Uncollateralized trades should then be consid-
ered not as derivatives but as new primary assets in the investor’s econ-
omy. Different choices of the risk–neutral measure correspond to different
completions of the market, based on the risk appetite of the investor, lead-
ing to different levels of value adjustments. We recover, in limiting cases,
results well known in the literature.
Introduction
The value of uncollateralized trades must be undoubtedly adjusted in view of the
credit merit of the trading parties. On the other hand, the magnitude of such
adjustment is still source of debate in the financial community [12, 13, 14]. In
particular, although credit and debt value adjustments (CVA/DVA) are rather
clearly understood, less so is the adjustment due to different effective unsecured
funding rates (FVA) faced by investors.
A variety of different approaches have been proposed in the literature [3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 1, 2], often leading to different final expressions for the
full value adjustment, even in the presence of identical assumptions on closeout
amounts in case of default of one of the trading names. One very natural
approach is based on the risk neutral valuation of all relevant cash flows. These
flows must, in particular, include exogenous funding flows potentially faced by
an investor when funding the full hedge [1, 2]. A different approach is based
on the direct analysis of the hedge of the trade, with the relevant part being
the hedge with funded instruments of the investor (typically bonds of different
seniority). Using this reasoning, one notes that, in general, not all cash flows
can be exactly hedged since an investor cannot, in general, trade collateralized
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protection on its own name. Different imperfect hedges are then possible, leading
naturally to different values for the full adjustment [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 18].
In this quick note we wish to combine the two points of view above. The
analysis of Burgard and Kjaer clearly shows that a general payoff, contingent on
the default of the investor, cannot be hedged, in general, by the investor itself.
This is due to the fact that, although external players can trade both funded and
collateralized protection on the investor’s name (bonds, CDS’s etc.), this is not
true from the point of view of the investor, which, in the most idealized setting,
can only trade funded instruments (bonds of a given seniority). Based on the
available hedging instruments, the investor then faces a market which is clearly
incomplete and cash flows of a general trade, including closeouts at time of
default, cannot be hedged exactly. In this sense, uncollateralized trades are not
derivatives but become new primary assets in the economy, whose value must be
determined on the basis of different reasoning, based on the risk appetite of the
investor. As is well known in finance theory [17], incompleteness of the market
is reflected directly in the non–uniqueness of the risk neutral bank account
measure used to discount future cash flows. Different levels of risk appetite
are then naturally parametrized by different choices of risk neutral measure.
Each choice then corresponds to a different way of completing the market in a
consistent arbitrage–free manner and leads to a different value adjustments for
the full trade.
In the next sections, we analyze the idea outlined above in the simplest
possible setting, where all market factors are considered as deterministic. This
allows us to focus on the essentials, with the unique source of randomness coming
from the default times of the trading names. More precisely, in section 1 we will
consider only the investor as defaultable, with different risk neutral measures
corresponding to different default intensities. This means that, for internal
valuations, the investor is free to choose the level of CDS’s on it’s own name
differently from the market level, adjusting the internal discount rate so as
to keep fixed the values of all market instruments which are tradable by the
investor, here chosen to be bonds of a given seniority. This leads to a simple
expression for the full value adjustment parametrized by the default intensity
of the investor. Section 2 extends the reasoning to the case of a defaultable
counterparty. Again, the investor is free to choose, for internal valuations, the
joint probability of default of the two trading names, keeping fixed available
market instruments. These include CDS’s on the counterparty’s name, which
fixes the default intensity of the counterparty to market levels, as well as bounds
of the investor, potentially contingent on the counterparty’s default event (credit
linked notes, for instance). The discount rate must then also be changed, with
the added feature that, in the presence of correlation between the default events,
the dynamics of such rate, as seen by the investor, becomes contingent on the
default of the counterparty, as we shall demonstrate in detail in the simplest
case. We conclude with a brief description of potential future work.
2
1 Risk free counterparty
1.1 The market as seen by the external players
In order to keep the discussion simple and to focus on essential matters, we will
consider all market factors as deterministic. The only random event will be the
default time of the investor τI , with the counterparty considered as default free.
Later in the discussion we will also model the default time of the counterparty
τC .
All external market players (aside from the investor itself) have access and
trade actively bonds and collateralized CDS’s of the investor, and have access
to the risk free money market. This determines, as usual, a market level for the
r (t) riskfree funded cash rate
rX (t) collateral OIS rate
λI (t) default intensity of the investor
The difference of the funded and the collateral rate gives rise to a liquidity basis
r (t)− rX (t) .
As mentioned above, we consider the above market quantities as deterministic.
Basic bonds of the investor will be zero–coupon bonds with recovery RI .
These bonds pay principal at maturity T in the absence of default and a fraction
RI of their value in case of default before maturity. They have a value of
PI (t, T ) · 1τI>t
determined by
dPI (t, T ) = rF (t)PI (t) dt
and PI (T, T ) = 1, where we denote with rF the effective funding rate of the
investor
rF (t) = r (t) + (1−RI)λI (t) .
1.2 The market as seen by the investor
The market, as seen by the external players, is complete. Any payoff, deter-
ministic or contingent to the default of the investor, can be perfectly replicated
with the available hedging instruments and no ambiguity exists in the pricing
of any stream of future dividends.
The situation is very different from the point of view of the investor. Al-
though the investor has access to its own bond market, where new debt can be
issued or bought–back, no direct access to the CDS market is available. The
only tradable primary assets are therefore the investor’s bonds, and the market,
from this prospective, is now incomplete. Not all dividend streams are perfectly
replicable and, for these payoffs, no unique price can be assigned. Finance the-
ory [17] teaches us that this non–uniqueness corresponds to a non–uniqueness
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in the risk–neutral measure. Recalling that we are only modeling the default of
the investor, we may then choose a different risk–free and default intensity
r¯ (t) riskfree cash rate as seen by the investor
λ¯I (t) default intensity of the investor as seen by the investor
with the unique constraint of keeping fixed the tradable assets in the economy
– i.e. the investor’s bonds. This can be easily achieved by keeping unaltered
the funding rate, imposing
rF (t) = r (t) + (1−RI)λI (t) = r¯ (t) + (1−RI) λ¯I (t) . (1)
From the investor’s point of view, different choices of λ¯I corresponds to different
internal quotes of the CDS market on it’s own name, which is excluded and not
directly tradable.
1.3 Value adjustment
Let us now consider a given contract which, in the absence of default events,
pays a stream of dividends
dq (t)
to the investor. These dividends are considered as deterministic, not contingent
to any default event.
First let us focus on the (perfectly) collateralized exchange of the above
dividends. It is then well known that default events are immaterial and that
the value of the collateral account vX (t) (also referred to, inaccurately, as the
riskfree value of the contract) satisfies
dq
dt
+
dvX
dt
= rXvX . (2)
Stated differently, future dividends are discounted at the collateral rate [15, 16].
We wish, on the other hand, to price the funded version of the above steam
of dividends, keeping into account the effects of the default of the investor.
Future dividends dq (t) are then exchanged only if the investor has not defaulted.
Moreover, in case of default, a deterministic closeout amount
kI (t)
is exchanged as a potentially partial substitute of the missed future dividends.
In formulae, the exact future dividends to be priced are given by
dQ (t) = dq (t) · 1τI>t+dt + kI (t) · 1t<τI<t+dt .
We will also denote the full value of the contract by
V (t) = v (t) · 1τI>t , (3)
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where υ (t) will again be a deterministic function to be determined.
As discussed above, we will be pricing under the risk–neutral measure E¯t
corresponding to the internal choice of the default intensity λ¯I of the investor.
The value of the contract (3) will, in general, depend on this choice, signaling
that no exact replica is available for the dividend stream dQ (t). The basic
pricing equation
E¯t [dQ (t) + dV (t)] = r¯ (t)V (t) , (4)
together with the simple facts
E¯t [dQ (t)] = 1τI>t ·
[
dq (t) + kI (t) λ¯I (t) dt
]
E¯t [dV (t)] = 1τI>t ·
[
dv (t)− v (t) λ¯I (t) dt
]
,
implies the fundamental equation
dq
dt
+
dv
dt
=
(
r¯ + λ¯I
)
v − λ¯IkI .
This equation should be compared with the corresponding one (2) for the riskfree
value vX . In particular, if we denote with
u (t) = v (t)− vX (t)
the value adjustment due to the funded and default contingent nature of the
full claim, we see that u must satisfy1
−
du
dt
+
(
r¯ + λ¯I
)
u = λ¯I (kI − vX)− (r¯ − rX) vX , (5)
together with the boundary condition that u (T ) = 0 at the maturity T of the
contractual dividends dq. Two cases are often discussed in the literature
−
du
dt
+ rFu = − (rF − rX) vX ,
−
du
dt
+ (r + λI)u = (kI − vX)λI − (r − rX) vX .
The first case corresponds to a pure discounting internal view–point, with a
vanishing intensity λ¯I = 0 of the investor’s default
2 and r¯ = rF . The opposite
extreme case corresponds to λ¯I = λI and r¯ = r, where the internal valuation of
CDS’s is equal to that of the market.
1We will write throughout value adjustment equations in differential form −du/dt+αu = β,
with u (T ) = 0. The corresponding integral form
u (t) =
ˆ
T
t
ds β (s) e−
´
s
t
α(s′)ds′
leads to well known expressions for the adjustment.
2The case λ¯I = 0 does not correspond to an equivalent measure when λI 6= 0, and the
corresponding prices allow arbitrage opportunities. One should consider this as a limiting case
of the allowed market completions defined by λ¯I = ε.˙
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To conclude, we consider the simplest case of closeout
kI = v
+
X −RIv
−
X ,
with RI the closeout recovery. The pricing equation for the value adjustment
then reads
−
du
dt
+
(
r¯ + λ¯I
)
u = (1−RI) λ¯Iv
−
X − (r¯ − rX) vX .
2 Defaultable counterparty
In this last section we will consider the case of a defaultable counterparty. All
other market factors will be considered as deterministic, with the unique source
of randomness coming from the default times of the investor and of the coun-
terparty.
As before, external players face deterministic risk free and collateral rates
r (t) and rX (t) and value the probability of defaults of the investor I and of the
counterparty C with survival probabilities
UN (tN ) = E [1τN>tN ]
(in the sequel, N will denote the credit names I and C) and corresponding
forward default intensities
λN (tN ) = −∂N lnUN (tN ) .
The correlation between the default events of the investor and of the counter-
party is described by the joint cumulative
U (tI , tC) = E [1τI>tI1τC>tC ] .
In the sequel, we will also use the following quantities
ΛN (t) = −∂N lnU (t, t)
which satisfy ΛN = λN only in the uncorrelated case corresponding to a factor-
ized joint cumulative U = UI · UC .
Following the same line of reasoning as in the previous section, the investor
is free to choose a different martingale measure and riskfree rate, keeping fixed
the values of the subset of market instruments which are available to him. In
particular, default probabilities will be different from the market ones, and we
will denote with bars, as before, the quantities U¯I , U¯C , U¯ , · · · as seen from the
investor’s perspective. Corresponding to a change in the default probabilities,
the investor sees a different short rate process
r¯ (t)
which, as we shall see later, cannot be modeled as deterministic in the presence
of a defaultable counterparty and must be fixed by imposing the equality of the
relevant bonds’ values. Note, though, that the equality of collateralized credit
products on the counterparty’s name simply implies that
U¯C (tC) = UC (tC) . (6)
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2.1 Value adjustment
Following closely the reasoning in section 1.3, we consider a stream of deter-
ministic dividends dq (t) exchanged between the counterparty and the investor,
with collateralized value vX (t) given by (2). The uncollateralized position cor-
responds then to the following complete dividends3
dQ (t) = dq (t) · 1τI>t+dt · 1τC>t+dt
+kI (t) · 1t<τI<t+dt · 1τC>t+dt
+kC (t) · 1τI>t+dt · 1t<τC<t+dt .
As usual, contractual dividends dq (t) are exchanged only if both parties are
alive. In case of default of a given name N , a deterministic closeout amount
kN (t) is exchanged, partially replacing lost future dividends. Denoting with
τ = τI ∧ τC
the first to default time, it is immediate to show that
E¯t [dQ (t)] = 1τ>t
[
dq (t)
dt
+ kI (t) Λ¯I (t) + kC (t) Λ¯C (t)
]
dt .
If we denote with
V (t) = 1τ>tv (t)
the value of the trade as seen by the investor, it is also simple to show that
E¯t [dV (t)] = 1τ>t
[
dv (t)
dt
−
(
Λ¯I (t) + Λ¯C (t)
)
v (t)
]
dt .
In order to apply the basic pricing equation (4), we must first recall that, as we
shall demonstrate concretely in the next section in a specific case, the internal
discount rate r¯ (t) will be, in general, contingent on the default time of the
counterparty. We can then write explicitly
r¯ (t) = r¯′ (t) · 1τC>t + · · · ,
where r¯′ represents the value of the internal discount rate prior to the default
of the counterparty and where · · · represents the realizations of r (t) in states
of the world when τC ≤ t. The pricing equation then implies
dq
dt
+
dv
dt
=
(
r¯′ + Λ¯I + Λ¯C
)
v − Λ¯IkI − Λ¯CkC ,
or, in terms of u = v − vX ,
−
du
dt
+
(
r¯′ + Λ¯I + Λ¯C
)
u = Λ¯I (kI − vX) + Λ¯C (kC − vX)− (r¯
′ − rX) vX , (7)
3In this paper, we will consider probability measures such that joint defaults do not occur
a.s.
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which generalizes (5).
As before, consider the simplest case of closeouts
kI = v
+
X −RIv
−
X
kC = RCv
+
X − v
−
X
in terms of closeout recoveries RI ,RC . The value adjustment equation then
reads
−
du
dt
+
(
r¯′ + Λ¯I + Λ¯C
)
u = (1−RI) Λ¯Iv
−
X − (1−RC) Λ¯Cv
+
X − (r¯
′ − rX) vX .
2.2 Interest rate model as seen by the investor
As described at the beginning of this section, once the internal default probabil-
ity U¯ (tI , tC) has been chosen (with the unique constraint (6)), the dynamics of
the short rate r¯ (t) must be determined in order to keep unaltered the values of
the relevant investor’s bonds. The rate r¯ (t) will not be deterministic in general,
but will be contingent on the default time of the counterparty.
More precisely, we will keep fixed the values of zero–coupon bonds which
pay, at maturity TI , the default contingent payoff
1τC>TC · 1τI>TI . (payed at TI > TC)
As before, these bonds pay, in case of default of the investor, a given recovery
fraction RI of their value.
2.2.1 Case of vanishing recovery and default–free investor
We will not consider in this paper the general case with arbitrary recovery RI
and choice of investor’s default intensity λ¯I (t). We will work here with the
simpler case of vanishing bond recovery
RI = 0
and default–free investor
λ¯I (t) = 0 .
This case has all the relevant qualitative features and, at the same time, is
analytically easily tractable. Denoting with D (t, T ) = e−
´
T
t
r(u)du the discount
factor (and similarly with D¯ (t, T )), we may equate the bond values within the
two pricing schemes and immediately write
E¯
[
1τC>TC D¯ (0, TI)
]
= E [1τC>TC · 1τI>TI D (0, TI)] (8)
= P (0, TI)U (T I , TC) ,
where TC < TI . If we then denote with D¯ (0, TI) [tC ] the bank account condi-
tional to τC = tC , it then follows that
D¯ (0, TI) [tC ] = P (0, TI) ·


∂CU(TI ,tC)
∂CUC(tC)
(tC < TI)
U(TI ,TI)
UC(TI)
(tC > TI)
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The case tC < TI is determined by direct differentiation of (8), whereas the case
tC > TI is fixed by using the limiting case of (8) for TC = 0, given by
E¯
[
D¯ (0, TI)
]
= P (0, TI)UI (TI) .
Note that, if the default events of the investor and the counterparty are uncor-
related, then D¯ (0, TI) [tC ] is independent of tC and hence deterministic. On
the other hand, in the general case, rates r¯ (t) do depend on the default event
of the counterparty and we have correlation between rates and relevant mar-
ket factors. In particular, the pre–default rate r¯′ (t) relevant in (7) is given by
−∂t ln D¯ (0, t) [∞] or by
r¯′ = r + ΛI + ΛC − λC .
Using this fact, together with
Λ¯I = λ¯I = 0 ,
Λ¯C = λ¯C = λC ,
the basic pricing equation finally reads
−
du
dt
+ (r + ΛI + ΛC)u = λC (kC − vX)− (r + ΛI + ΛC − λC − rX) vX . (9)
2.2.2 Independent default events
Finally, we briefly consider the case of independent default events, with U =
UI · UC and U¯ = U¯I · U¯C . This case is rather trivial and we can work with a
general RI and λ¯I . We just spell out the relevant results. The internal rate r¯ is
deterministic and such that the funding rate is invariant, as in (1). Moreover,
the basic value adjustment equation 7 simply reads
−
du
dt
+
(
r¯ + λ¯I + λC
)
u = λ¯I (kI − vX) + λC (kC − vX)− (r¯ − rX) vX .
The usual two important limiting cases are λ¯I = λI , r¯ = r, with value adjust-
ment in line with external market consensus and determined by
−
du
dt
+ (r + λI + λC)u = λI (kI − vX) + λC (kC − vX)− (r − rX) vX ,
and the pure–funding point of view λ¯I = 0, r¯ = rF , leading to
−
du
dt
+ (rF + λC) u = λC (kC − vX)− (rF − rX) vX .
This last expression, when RI = 0 and rF = r + λI , should be compared with
(9), which represents the extension to the correlated case.
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3 Conclusions
We have analyzed value adjustment from the point of view of derivative pric-
ing in incomplete markets, and we have done so in the simplest cases, when
randomness comes uniquely from the default times of the trading parties. It is
quite clear that the present approach can be extended to the case of stochastic
market factors, and little changes will occur in final formulae in the absence of
correlations of the investor’s default time with relevant market factors. More
work is needed, though, to handle correlations in a more general framework.
As seen in section 2.2.1, the case of credit–credit correlation already poses some
complexity and does not have a simple and analytic solution in the general case.
It is then advisable to focus not on the general case, but to choose a specific
model of correlation which retains the relevant and desired qualitative features
and, at the same time, leads to analytic tractability of the problem. We leave
such analysis to future work.
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